

Message Text

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FOR CARTER FROM PA

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TAGS: SOPN, OVIP (VANCE)

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith FULL TEXT FRONT-PAGE BY-LINER BY
CHARLES MOHR, NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, AUGUST 26, HEADED
"CARTER ORDERS STEPS TO INCREASE ABILITY TO MEET WAR
THREATS."

2. WASHINGTON, AUGUST 25--AFTER MONTHS OF PREPARATION
AND STUDY, PRESIDENT CARTER HAS ISSUED A SECRET DIREC-
TIVE ON NATIONAL STRATEGY THAT COMMITS THE UNITED
STATES TO MODEST INCREASES IN DEFENSE SPENDING, SEEKS
TO IMPROVE THE COMBAT ABILITY OF AMERICAN FORCES IN
EUROPE TO ABSORB AN INITIAL SHOCK AND CALLS FOR LIGHT,
MOBILE AND FLEXIBLE FORCES TO MEET THREATS IN SUCH
AREAS AS THE MIDDLE EAST, THE PERSIAN GULF AND EAST
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ASIA.

3. IN THE RELATIVELY BRIEF AND CRISPLY WORDED DIREC-
TIVE, MR. CARTER ALSO INSTRUCTED SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
HAROLD BROWN AND MILITARY PLANNERS TO REVIEW THE
"TARGETING POLICY" THAT WOULD DIRECT NUCLEAR WAR-HEADS
TO LOCATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION IN CASE OF NUCLEAR

WAR.

5. ONE AIM OF THE TARGETING REVIEW, ACCORDING TO ADMINISTRATION SOURCES WHO DISCUSSED THE NEW STRATEGY DIRECTIVE, IS TO MAINTAIN THE CAPABILITY TO INFLICT "UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE" TO THE SOVIET UNION EVEN IF THAT NATION STRUCK FIRST WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT ANOTHER AIM DESCRIBED BY MR. CARTER WAS TO DEVELOP OPTIONS FOR LIMITED NUCLEAR RESPONSES BY THE UNITED STATES TO AVOID ESCALATION TO UNLIMITED CONFLICT.

6. THE POLICY ADOPTED BY THE PRESIDENT MAY CALM THE FEARS OF BOTH HAWKS AND DOVES, WITHOUT SATISFYING EITHER ENTIRELY. IT DOES NOT, AN ADMINISTRATION SOURCE REMARKED, REPRESENT A RADICAL DEPARTURE FROM PAST STRATEGIC POLICY BUT IT IS INTENDED TO BE A MORE SOPHISTICATED AND FLEXIBLE OUTLINE FOR MANAGING RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

7. THE DOCUMENT DOES NOT, AS SOME HAWKS HAD FEARED, "CONCEDE" THE LOSS OF A LARGE PART OF WEST GERMANY IN THE CASE OF A SUDDEN, SURPRISE ATTACK BY THE WARSAW PACT FORCES, THE SOVIET BLOC. NEITHER DOES IT COMMIT THE UNITED STATES TO A POLICY AIMED AT BEING ABLE TO STOP SUCH AN ATTACK IN ITS TRACKS, WHICH PROBABLY WOULD REQUIRE MASSIVE INCREASES IN DEFENSE SPENDING.

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8. THE PRESIDENT, THEREFORE, REASSERTED AMERICAN ADHERENCE TO EXISTING NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION STRATEGY OF A "FORWARD DEFENSE." MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, THE PRESIDENT ORDERED THAT UNITED STATES POLICY SHOULD BE TO SEE THAT A SURPRISE ATTACK BY COMMUNIST FORCES RESULTED IN A "MINIMUM" LOSS OF TERRITORY AND THAT PREWAR BOUNDARIES BE RESTORED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

9. ALTHOUGH THE DOCUMENT NEVER MENTIONS THE WORD "DETENTE," THE PRESIDENT INSTRUCTED THAT DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENTS BE USED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF NATIONAL STRATEGY CONCERNING THE SOVIET UNION--WHICH IS APPARENTLY SEEN AS THE ONLY PLAUSIBLE MAJOR ENEMY.

10. ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS, FOR INSTANCE, SHOULD BE SOUGHT IF THEY ENHANCE UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY, MR. CARTER SAID, AND EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO DRAW THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP INTO A WIDENING PATTERN OF "GLOBAL COOPERATION" AND INCREASED UNITED STATES-RUSSIAN TRADE.

11. THE DIRECTIVE, OR DECISION MEMORANDUM, IS A STRATEGIC BLUEPRINT OF HOW THE PRESIDENT WISHES POLICY

TO BE MADE WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET UNION. ITS COMPLETION FOLLOWED A PROLONGED REVIEW OF "STRATEGY AND FORCE POSTURE" BY LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND STATE AND EXTENDED DEBATE IN THE SO-CALLED SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE DOMINATED BY SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS R. VANCE, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BROWN AND ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, THE WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.

12. THIS DEBATE WAS CLOSELY FOLLOWED FROM THE SIDELINES UNCLASSIFIED

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BY EXPONENTS OF VARYING IDEOLOGIES, WHO OCCASIONALLY LEAKED THEIR OWN APPREHENSIONS TO JOURNALISTS.

13. THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING BY ABOUT 3 PERCENT EACH YEAR IN "REAL" TERMS, WITH INFLATION DISCOUNTED, IN CONJUNCTION WITH SIMILAR ACTION BY THE OTHER MEMBERS OF NATO.

14. THE DIRECTIVE ALSO CALLS FOR AMERICAN FORCES IN WESTERN EUROPE TO ACHIEVE ENHANCED "INITIAL" COMBAT ABILITY, OR THE ABILITY TO RESPOND RAPIDLY TO AN ATTACK.

15. STEPS SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN, THE DIRECTIVE SAID, TO ASSURE THE SAFETY OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND SUPPLY, PRESUMABLY TO KEEP NATO FORCES IN EFFECTIVE COMBAT AFTER AN INVASION.

16. SOME ADVOCATES OF STRONGER DEFENSE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT MORE AMERICAN FORCES BE SHIFTED FROM SOUTHERN GERMANY TO THE NORTH GERMAN PLAIN, WHERE AN ATTACK SEEMS MORE LIKELY; THAT MORE SUPPLIES BE STOCKPILED IN EUROPE AND THAT FIREPOWER AVAILABLE TO UNITED STATES FORCES BE INCREASED.

17. ADMINISTRATION SOURCES SAID IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SAY WHETHER THE BROAD DIRECTIVE BY THE PRESIDENT MIGHT RESULT IN SUCH STEPS. MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PLANNERS MUST NOW ATTEMPT TO GIVE THE DIRECTIVE MORE CONCRETE FORM AND THE FINAL RESULT IS NOT EASY TO PREDICT.

18. ANOTHER INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE PRESIDENT WAS UNCLASSIFIED

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THAT A FORCE FOR SO-CALLED "LIGHT" DIVISIONS BE
READYED FOR POSSIBLE USE IN SUCH AREAS AS THE MIDDLE
EAST, THE PERSIAN GULF AND ASIA.

19. THESE FORCES WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY SELECTED
NAVAL AND TACTICAL AIR FORCE UNITS THAT COULD OPERATE
WITHOUT THE NEED OF PERMANENT, FIXED FOREIGN BASES.
SUCH CAPABILITY NOW EXISTS IN OTHER UNITS THAT INCLUDE
THE 18TH AIRBORNE CORPS, BUT PRESUMABLY THE PRESIDENT'S
DIRECTIVE WILL LEAD TO REFINEMENTS IN SUCH FORCES.

20. THE SECOND ARMY DIVISION, WHICH IS NOW STATIONED
IN KOREA BUT WHICH WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM THAT
PENINSULA OVER A FOUR-TO-FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, WILL BE
GIVEN SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY AS A RAPID REACTION FORCE
IN ASIA, INCLUDING SOUTH KOREA, IF THAT NATION CAME
UNDER ATTACK. OTHER FORCES IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC
WOULD BE MAINTAINED AT LEAST AT PRESENT LEVELS.

21. THE PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE EXPRESSED BROAD
INTELLECTUAL ASSUMPTIONS AND SPECIFIC MEASURES THAT
GROW OUT OF THOSE ASSUMPTIONS.

22. MR. CARTER OBSERVED THAT IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS
RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PROBABLY BE
MARKED BY CONTINUING COMPETITION BUT ALSO BY INCREASED
OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION.

23. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED AN OPINION THAT IN SUCH
COMPETITION THE UNITED STATES ENJOYED A NUMBER OF
IMPORTANT ADVANTAGES, INCLUDING A SIGNIFICANTLY
STRONGER TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMY. HE ALSO SAID THAT
THE UNITED STATES ENJOYED THE SUPPORT OF GENUINE
ALLIES, COMMITTED TO SIMILAR POLITICAL AND PHILOSO-
PHICAL GOALS. THE SOVIET UNION, HE CONTENDED, FACES
SEVERE INTERNAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND
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HAS LARGELY UNWILLING ALLIES.

24. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PRESIDENT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
THE SOVIET UNION HAD MADE STRIKING MILITARY PROGRESS
AND NOW HAD "ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE" WITH THE UNITED
STATES.

25. THE DIRECTIVE DID NOT DEMAND THAT THE UNITED STATES ONCE MORE ACHIEVE STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY AND THUS, IN EFFECT, IT CONCEDED AN ERA OF EQUIVALENCE. HOWEVER, AS ADMINISTRATION SOURCES PUT IT, THE PRESIDENT DIRECTED THAT THE US WILL NOT ACCEPT A POSTURE OF STRATEGIC INFERIORITY.

26. PLANNING SHOULD BE AIMED, THE PRESIDENT ORDERED, AT MAINTAINING NUCLEAR STABILITY OF POWER.

27. MR. CARTER SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO GAIN WHAT IS CALLED A "DISARMING" FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY SO POWERFUL THAT IT WOULD RENDER THE SOVIET UNION INCAPABLE OF EFFECTIVE COUNTER-ATTACK--AS LONG AS MOSCOW ALSO ESCHEWED THIS KNOCK-OUT CAPABILITY.

28. AS HAD BEEN PAST AMERICAN STRATEGY, MR. CARTER ORDERED THAT THE UNITED STATES RETAIN THE ABILITY TO INFLICT UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE ON RUSSIA EVEN AFTER A FIRST STRIKE BY THAT NATION. HE ALSO DIRECTED THAT A "RESERVE" OF STRATEGIC FORCES BE MAINTAINED, SAFE FROM ATTACK, FOR USE IF NUCLEAR WAR BECAME RELATIVELY EXTENDED.

29. THE FIRST DUTY OF THE STRATEGIC FORCES SHOULD BE UNCLASSIFIED

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TO DETER ATTACK BY THE SOVIET UNION, THE PRESIDENT SAID, BUT THESE FORCES SHOULD BE STRONG ENOUGH THAT A POSSIBLE NUCLEAR WAR WOULD END ON THE MOST FAVORABLE TERMS POSSIBLE TO THE US.

30. SIGNIFICANTLY, MR. CARTER ALSO ASKED THAT THE SOVIET UNION BE PREVENTED FROM ATTAINING ENOUGH STRATEGIC POWER TO DETER OR COERCE THE US FROM TAKING ACTION WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN AREAS CONSIDERED VITAL TO US INTERESTS.

31. THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE MADE CLEAR THAT BECAUSE AN ERA OF NUCLEAR EQUIVALENCE HAD DAWNED, INCREASING SIGNIFICANCE MUST BE GIVEN TO CONVENTIONAL MILITARY POWER.

32. IN THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE, HE REITERATED THAT AMERICAN STRATEGY DEPENDED NOT MERELY ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE, BUT ALSO ON "THEATER" OR TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES AND ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. CHRISTOPHER

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